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Abstract
Recently, philosophers have oৰered compelling reasons to think that demon-
stratives are best represented as variables, sensitive not to the context of uऔerance,
but to a variable assignment. Variablists typically explain familiar intuitions about
demonstratives—intuitions that suggest that what is said by way of a demonstrative
sentence varies systematically over contexts—by claiming that contexts initialize a
particular assignment of values to variables. I argue that we do not need to link con-
text and the assignment parameter in this way, and that we would do beऔer not to.
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1 Introduction
If you are in themarket for a view about the semantics of demonstratives, youwill not ৱnd
yourself wanting for options. For each of the remotely plausible ways of unpacking the
idea that demonstratives are devices of direct reference, there are philosophers who have
staked a claim.1 Others have argued that demonstratives are really quantiৱer expressions.2
डere are hybrid views that straddle these two positions, according to which demonstra-
tives involve both a quantiৱcational and a directly-referential component.3 Philosophers
have given reasons for thinking of demonstratives as a special kind of Fregean deৱnite
∗Forthcoming in Mind and Language
1Compare Kaplan (1977), Braun (1996), Salmon (2002), and many others.
2Compare King (1999, 2001, 2008).
3Compare Lepore & Ludwig (2000).
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description,4 as devices that introduce discourse referents,5 and as variables of the sort
familiar from logic.6
Despite signiৱcant diৰerences of detail, however, nearly all of these approaches involve
some version of contextualism: the idea that the context in which a demonstrative sen-
tence is uऔered determines which proposition the sentence expresses. डe literature on
demonstratives has mostly developed around the question of how best to implement
contextualism—e.g., on questions like which features of a context determine the proposi-
tional contribution of a demonstrative expression, or which propositional architecture is
best suited for representing demonstrative sentences—as opposed to questions about the
status of the thesis of context sensitivity per se.
Although my aim here will be to argue that this is a mistake, it is not hard to see why
contextualist theories have had the reach that they do. In general, the data available to
guide us in semantic theorizing are intuitions about whether certain sentences would be
true or false in certain circumstances, or intuitions about what someone would be saying
(or what she would be commiऔed to, or what she would communicate, or whatever) if
she were to uऔer a certain sentence in certain circumstances. Where demonstratives are
concerned, those intuitions vary in a fairly consistent way across contexts; typically, if I
uऔer a demonstrative while pointing at α, you will take me to have said something about
α (said something the truth of which depends on how things are with α, etc.), and if I
uऔer the demonstrative while pointing at β, you will take me to have said something
about β.
On the earliest systematic treatments of demonstratives, these intuitive data were ex-
plained directly in the semantics. According to Kaplan (1977), for example, knowing the
meaning of ‘that’ involves knowing a rule that takes a context of uऔerance and returns
an object. On this view, as long as someone knows which context she is in, her semantic
competence will underwrite her intuitions about demonstratives. Why do you take me
to be talking about α when I point towards α and uऔer a demonstrative? Because you
know that the semantic value of a demonstrative in a context is the object ostended by
the speaker (say), that I am the speaker, and that I am pointing at α.
In recent years, the picture has become more complicated. When we look at the full range
of ways in which demonstratives are used in natural language, a semantics that treats
them as variables turns out to be more theoretically plausible than a semantics based on
rules mapping contexts to objects. At the same time, increased aऔention to the divergent
4Compare Elbourne (2005)
5Compare Roberts (2002), Stojnić et al. (2013, 2017).
6Compare Kaplan (1989); Rabern (2012a,b, 2013), and others.
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theoretical aims of a compositional semantic theory and a theory of assertion or commu-
nication has made philosophers less sanguine about assuming that the semantic value of
an expression will be the sort of thing that is apt to serve as its propositional contribution,
too. डis means that a potential gap looms between the intuitive data and the theoretical
postulates of the semantic theory. We have the sense that someone pointing at α while
uऔering a demonstrative has said something about α, but that fact is not captured by the
semantics, which represents the demonstrative simply as a free variable.
With a bit of maneuvering, however, the contextualist can take complications like these
on board and still preserve the essential outlines of her approach to the intuitive demon-
strative data. Lewis (1980) showed how the proposition associated with a sentence in a
context can be derived from a semantic value that is not itself directly sensitive to context,
but to a set of more ৱne-grained parameters (that may themselves be initialized by the
context). Rabern (2012a) applies Lewis-style machinery to demonstratives; if we endorse
a principle linking variable assignments and contexts of uऔerance, we can bridge the gap
between assignment sensitive semantic values and the apparently context sensitive con-
tents that are at issue when demonstratives are used. On Rabern’s view, the contexts in
which it would be appropriate to use a demonstrative are precisely those contexts that
initialize a particular assignment of values to variables.
डis move away from a position on which contextualism is built into the lexical semantics
of demonstrative expressions, towards a view on which context plays its role in what
MacFarlane (2014) calls the ‘post-semantics’, is surely a step in the right direction. In this
paper, however, I will argue that the move does not go quite far enough. A parametrized
version of contextualism—i.e., a theory on which context wields its in৲uence indirectly,
by seऔing the value of some other parameter to which demonstratives are sensitive—
allows us to give a treatment that is superior to the traditional alternative in terms of the
compositional semantics, but it does nothing to address deeper issues raised by the thesis
of contextualism itself.
डe most striking of these is that four decades of work have not resulted in substantial
convergence on a story about which features of a context determine the propositional
contribution of a demonstrative. Moving context sensitivity from the semantics to the
post-semantics simply moves the locus of this problem; a fully ৲eshed-out version of
parametric contextualismwill have to say not just that contexts initialize an assignment of
values to variables, but whi࠼ contexts initialize whi࠼ assignments and why. Answering
these questions will involve facing a host of familiar bogeymen. Should we say that it is
a speaker’s referential intention that determines the variable assignment? Or facts about
the speaker’s ostensive gestures? If the existing literature is any guide, some people will
want to say that the variable assignment is determined just in case the speaker and hearer
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in fact aऔend to the same object, and others will prefer a view based on partially-idealized
versions of one agent or the other.
Instead of revisiting the debates to which questions like these gave rise, I will argue that
we would do beऔer to see the variablist semantics for demonstratives as oৰering a way to
avoid taking on a commitment to contextualism in the ৱrst place. डe basic thrust of my
argument will be simple. I will claim that in many contexts, no single proposition is apt to
play all of the explanatory roles we intuitively expect ‘the proposition expressed’ to play;
in some cases our intuitions track the proposition the speaker intended, in some cases the
proposition listeners picked up on, in some cases we care about both, and in other cases
other things altogether. We can avoid having to say that one of these senses of ‘express’
is more fundamental that the rest if we embrace a form of pluralism about content, i.e.,
if we associate a demonstrative sentence in a context not with a single proposition, but
with multiple propositions.
डe idea that a single uऔerance might express a range of diৰerent propositions is, of
course, not a new one.7 Cappelen & Lepore (2005), Egan et al. (2005), and Egan (2009), for
example, all claim that one uऔerance can serve as the realizer of multiple assertions, each
involving a potentially diৰerent content. On an alternative endorsed by Cappelen (2008)
and criticized by Egan (2009) and MacFarlane (2014), the content associated with an as-
sertion is determined not just with regard to the context of uऔerance, but the context of
interpretation, as well. I imagine that a variety of broadly pluralistic views could be de-
veloped aऑer the fashion of Lasersohn (1999)’s ‘pragmatic halos’, or by treating discourse
involving demonstratives as though it involved metalinguistic negotiation along the lines
of Barker (2002, 2013) and Plunkeऔ (2015). An anonymous referee has pointed out that the
arguments I give here might be taken to show that demonstratives should be treated as
quasi-indexicals, in the sense of Khoo (2018).
Although I am tempted by the idea of bona ৱde relativism about demonstrative contents,
I will not aऔempt here to argue speciৱcally for one or another of these or other possi-
ble non-contextualist positions, or even to distinguish between them in any detail. For
now, my aim will be the more general aim of drawing out a pair of points that have not
received the aऔention they deserve in this literature or in the literature on demonstra-
tives. First, that the intuitive data about demonstratives can be explainedwithout claiming
that there is a particular canonical content associated with a demonstrative sentence in a
context. And second, that the (independently motivated) variablist semantics for demon-
stratives provides a natural way of implementing a pluralist view about content—all that
7Indeed, as an anonymous referee points out, even Lewis (1980) can, in a sense, be taken to endorse a
form of pluralism, since he distinguishes ‘horizontal’ and ‘diagonal’ propositions (pg. 94).
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is required to make pluralism an open possibility is to reject the idea that contexts of
uऔerance initialize a certain assignment of values to variables.8
For those who like to keep a map in mind, in section 2, I oৰer a quick review of the classic
approach to demonstratives, on which contextualism is built into in the lexical semantics.
In section 3, I present two arguments that favor a semantics that treats demonstratives as
variables; one involves binding and anaphora, and one involves considerations of theo-
retical parsimony. In section 4, I show how philosophers have transposed classical con-
textualist views into a variablist key by claiming that context initializes a certain variable
assignment, thus indirectly serving to determine the referents of demonstratives. In sec-
tion 5, I argue that the parametrized version of contextualism is wrong, since it requires a
problematic commitment to the idea that a single proposition should count as the propo-
sition expressed by a demonstrative sentence in a context, and in section 6, I sketch what
I consider a preferable position that involves pluralism about demonstrative contents. In
section 7, I close with discussion of a pair of loose ends.
While I focus my aऔention here entirely on data involving singular simple demonstra-
tives, I intend the present work to serve as a case study that illustrates a more general
phenomenon.9 If the conclusions I reach about demonstratives are warranted, similar ar-
guments might be constructed against parametrized forms of contextualism in other do-
mains.10
2 Lexical semantic contextualism
Although the literature on demonstratives is ৱlled with twists and turns, complexities and
counterexamples, sentences like the following exemplify the basic explanatory challenge
demonstratives pose:
8An anonymous referee observes that one could endorse pluralism without rejecting the idea that con-
texts initialize assignments of values to variables by taking the context to supply not one, but a cluster of
variable assignments. Although I would prefer the resulting position to the kind of monism that is standard
today, I think there are reasons to prefer a cleaner break. I oৰer some discussion of those reasons in section
7.1.
9I oৰer an extensive analysis of the particular issues raised by complex demonstratives in Nowak (2014)
and Nowak (2015). Most of those issues are orthogonal to the questions about context that are at issue here,
so I set them aside. For readers worried about how to ৱt a variablist semantics for demonstrative pronouns
together with data that suggest demonstrative determiners involve a quantiৱcational element, compare e.g.,
Lepore & Ludwig (2000) and Elbourne (2005).
10Compare, e.g. Yalcin (2011) on epistemic modals and Khoo (2018) on gradable adjectives.
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(1) डat is Mount Shasta.
If we are standing on some high ground in northern California on a clear day and I ut-
ter (1) while pointing at Mount Shasta, you will take me to have said something (true)
about Shasta. If I uऔer the sentence while pointing at Lassen Peak, you will take me to
have said something (false) about Lassen.11 In other words, ordinary speaker intuitions
about demonstrative sentences appear to vary systematically over hypothetical contexts
of uऔerance.
Kaplan (1977) described a piece of theoretical machinery that facilitates a certain straight-
forward explanation of these intuitions. On Kaplan’s view, the semantic value of a demon-
strative in a context is simply the object ostended by the speaker of the context. He gets
that result by applying an operator—dthat—to a constituent with the semantic type of a
deৱnite description:
(2) JthatKc,w
=Jdthat (the object ostended by the speaker of c)Kc,w
=Jthe object ostended by the speaker of cKc,wc
In Kaplan’s narrative remarks, he says the purpose of dthat is to take a singular term and
turn it into a directly referential expression. When the operator is applied to the deৱnite
description ‘the object ostended by the speaker’, for example, the result is a directly ref-
erential expression whose content is whichever object was ostended by the speaker of
the context in which the demonstrative was used. In the formalism, this eৰect is captured
by treating dthat as a rigidifying operator; it sets the value of the world parameter with
regard to which the expressions it operates on are evaluated.12
Over the years, an increasing focus on natural language semantics per se—as opposed
to the logical properties of demonstratives—has led to a consolidation of the work done
by Kaplan’s dthat operator and the deৱnite description it applies to. So, instead of (2),
nowadays we are more likely to see formulations like:
(3) JthatKc,w = the object ostended by the speaker of c
At the same time,most philosophers—including a later time-slice of Kaplan himself (1989)—
have come to think of a speaker’s referential intentions as more important than her
11डis might involve a communicated content, or truth conditions, or the undertaking of a certain sort
of commitment. For now, let us agree to ignore these subtleties.
12Read (2): ‘the extension of “that” with regard to a context c and any world w is just the extension of
“the object ostended by the speaker” when evaluated at the world of c.’
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gestures. So the description used to ৱx the referent of the demonstrative is commonly
amended along the following lines:
(4) JthatKc,w = the object intended by the speaker of c
For present purposes, the diৰerences between these and any of the many increasingly-
sophisticated permutations that have appeared in the literature are less important than
the basic shape of the proposal. If we think that demonstrative expressions lexically en-
code a rule that maps a context to an extension, we make a simple explanation of the
intuitive data available. If I know this rule—knowwhat ‘that’ means, in the sense that any
English speaker would—and you uऔer (1) in a context in which I take you to be pointing
at Mount Shasta, then I will treat Shasta as the extension of your demonstrative.
On reasonable assumptions about semantic composition and about the contributions of
predicates, this means the semantic value of a demonstrative sentence in a context will
be a proposition, i.e., something that is or that determines a mapping from worlds to
truth values. Semantic contextualism, in other words, provides a direct explanation of
familiar intuitions about the truth conditions of demonstrative sentences, about what
such sentences say in a context, and so on.
3 Problems for lexical semantic contextualism
Since lexical semantic contextualism appears to make the right predictions about themost
obvious data involving demonstratives, and since it does so in a way that many philoso-
phers have found intuitively appealing, the position is a natural starting point for inquiry.
As it turns out, however, lexical semantic contextualism faces substantial di৳culties when
the full range of considerations that bear on the question of the compositional semantics
of demonstrative expressions is taken into account. I this section, I present two arguments
against the view, one that has been made in several places, and one that is new, as far as
I know.13
13An anonymous referee points out that Predelli (2012, 2013) oৰers still another class of argument against
lexical semantic contextualism. On Predelli’s view, theories that build substantive reference-ৱxing con-
straints into the lexical entry for the demonstrative determiner make bad predictions about the entailments
demonstrative sentences generate.
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3.1 Parity, binding, and anaphora
Binding arguments have frequently been used in philosophy to show that some construc-
tion or other must involve variables at some level of representation.14 While the fact that
a certain expression type appears to admit bound readings is not incontrovertible proof
that the expression involves a variable element,15 where demonstratives are concerned,
the case is strong.
डe apparent similarities between demonstratives and pronouns pose a serious problem
for the lexical contextualist semantics for demonstratives. Like demonstratives, pronouns
are oऑen used to pick out an object that is salient in the context of uऔerance. Consider
the following sentence uऔered by someone pointing at a particular man:16
(5) He looks sleepy.
Indeed, Kaplan’s original treatment of demonstratives was meant to cover such uses of
pronouns, too; Kaplan assumed that ‘he’ picks out the biologically male animate object
ostended by the speaker of the context, or intended by the speaker of the context, or
whatever.
Lexical semantic contextualism about pronouns, however, is undermined by the fact that
what appear to be the very same lexical items that are sometimes interpreted referentially
are also sometimes interpreted as bound variables:
(6) Every man at the debatei worried that hei looked low-energy.
Kaplan (1977) assumes that this fact can be handled by claiming that the two readings are
produced by two fundamentally diৰerent semantic objects. On this story, the referential
reading would involve a lexical item that is semantically sensitive to the context of ut-
terance (presumably along the lines proposed in the previous section), while the bound
reading would involve a lexical item with the semantics of a variable.
डere is a simple and powerful argument against this kind of treatment, however. In awide
variety of unrelated languages, what appear on the surface to be the same pronouns admit
both referential and bound readings. डis makes a uniform semantics for pronouns much
more aऔractive than an ambiguity theory. Since it is not plausible to treat the covarying
14Stanley (2000), Stanley & Szabó (2000), and Stanley (2002) oৰer prominent examples of the strategy.
15Compare, e.g., Rothschild & Segal (2009).
16I use a gendered pronoun here to defuse any complications involving phi-features; some readers have
complained about examples of binding involving the gender-neutral ‘they’.
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readings as the result of a systematic permutation of the context with regard to which
the pronoun is interpreted,17 most theorists have concluded that pronouns, in all their
guises, are best represented semantically as variables.18 डe diৰerence between the two
readings is typically taken to be due to diৰerences in the linguistic environments in which
the pronoun can occur (i.e., whether it occurs free, or under the scope of an assignment-
shiऑing operator).
डis fact about pronouns entails a dilemma for the person who wants to defend a lexi-
cal contextualist semantics for demonstratives. If she maintains that the referential and
bound readings for pronouns are produced by the same semantic machinery, she must
claim that demonstratives are fundamentally semantically diৰerent from referential pro-
nouns. If she wants to oৰer a uniform treatment of demonstratives and referential pro-
nouns along the contextualist lines we saw in the previous section, she must deny that
the referential and bound variable readings of pronouns involve the same semantic ele-
ments.
Instead of impaling ourselves on one of these horns, we can avoid the dilemma by treat-
ing demonstratives using the same machinery that appears to be required to handle pro-
nouns: the machinery of variables and assignments. We can say, that is, that like pro-
nouns, demonstratives should be semantically represented as variables, and interpreted
with regard to an assignment function.
At ৱrst glance, however, such a proposal would appear to run into a substantial problem:
simple demonstratives resist binding of the sort we commonly see with pronouns. So, for
example, while (7) is felicitous, (8) is not:19
(7) Every IKEA kiti comes with instructions for assembling iti.
(8) #Every IKEA kiti comes with instructions for assembling thati.
If the demonstrative from (8) were a variable, other things being equal, we would expect it
to be bindable by the higher quantiৱer expression ‘every IKEA kit’, and thus to result in a
reading on which kits and instruction sets covary. In fact, we ৱnd no such reading.
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that this is a fatal counterexample to the variablist seman-
tics for ‘that’. For one thing, it may be possible to explain the missing bound readings
17डat is, since it is not plausible to treat the semantic contextualist’s lexical entry as basic, while ana-
lyzing the bound readings as though they involved monstrous shiऑing of the context of evaluation. See del
Prete & Zucchi (2017) for discussion.
18See Heim & Kratzer (1998) for the textbook treatment.
19डis pair of examples and the related discussion are due to an anonymous referee.
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by claiming that ‘that’ and ‘it’ are in complementary distribution, at least with regard to
examples like (7) and (8). We know from classic work on binding theory that pronominal
elements are highly sensitive to the syntactic and semantic relationships they stand in
to potential antecedents: some elements require that they be locally bound, others per-
mit local binding, and others still rule binding out.20 Given this general fact, it does not
seem implausible to think that ‘it’ and ‘that’ might be distinguished as the bound and free
versions of the same basic element.
Further support for a hypothesis involving lexical competition can be had from the fact
that as strongly as ‘that’ resists binding, ‘it’ resists free uses. Imagine that we are standing
at a scenic overlook. Gesturing in the direction of some striking object, I might felicitously
ask:21
(9) Do you see that?
If, on the other hand, I were to say:
(10) #Do you see it?
the result would be strongly marked. डe upshot is that ‘missing’ bound readings for
simple demonstratives do not amount to a conclusive reason for rejecting a variablist
semantics.
As an alternative argumentative strategy, or perhaps together with a story about lexi-
cal competition, the variablist might point to the fact that in at least some cases, simple
demonstratives can apparently be bound by a c-commanding antecedent. An anonymous
referee points out that Elbourne (2008) oৰers the following data to make this point:
(11) Mary talked to no senator without declaring aऑerwards that that was the one who
would cosponsor her bill.
(12) Mary talked to no senator without thinking at the time that this was the one who
would cosponsor her bill.
At the very least, these data suggest that the question of syntactic binding is more com-
plicated than it at ৱrst appears; while I do not take myself to have seऔled the case here, on
20Compare Reinhart (1976), Chomsky (1981), Reinhart & Reuland (1993), and many others.
21Compare Barbara Partee’s (unpublished) case of the missing marble, which contrasts the felicitousOne
of the ten marbles is not in the bag. It is probably under the sofa with the infelicitous Nine of the ten marbles
are in the bag. ⁇It is probably under the sofa.
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balance, it appears that the variablist has a much beऔer prospect of explaining the facts
than the lexical contextualist does.
डis point is substantially reinforced when we turn our aऔention to data like the follow-
ing:
(13) If you have a pencil, bring that with you to the test.22
Explaining the interpretations produced by pseudo-bound or donkey anaphoric constituents
like ‘that’ as it appears in (13) is a challenge for everyone, and I will not defend an anal-
ysis of the phenomenon here. Once again, the key point for us is that data like (13) put
the lexical contextualist in an especially awkward position. If ‘that’, with regard to a con-
text, picks out the unique object the speaker of the context intends to refer to, the only
clear candidate strategies for explaining the natural interpretation of (13) will end up de-
pending on the claim that the antecedent introduces monstrous context-shiऑing, or on
the aऔribution of referential intentions to the speaker that are much more complicated
than the garden variety.23 I suspect few lexical contextualists will be tempted by either
option.
If we say ‘that’ introduces a variable, on the other hand, the task of explaining data like
(13) seems tractable. All we need is a story about how the variable assignment might be
aৰected non-locally, a story that will presumably be similar to the one we use to explain
the following structurally-similar variation on (13) formed with a pronoun:
(14) If you know a guy who smokes, you should tell him to quit.
In summary, then, the balance of evidence from binding appears to suggest a variablist
treatment for demonstratives. डe variablist treatment allows us to give a uniৱed theory
22डanks to Seth Yalcin for this example. If the imperative mood seems to introduce a complication,
consider the alternative (overheard): If you have a roller bag, you will want to put that in the overhead
lo࠻er with the feet pointed out. Although King (2001) made it clear that complex demonstratives allow
‘quantifying-in’, i.e., the binding of pronominal elements from which they are formed, examples in which
simple demonstratives produce bound or pseudo-bound readings on their own have not oऑen been the
focus of much philosophical aऔention. Among philosophers who have mentioned the phenomenon, most
appear to think that it is not aऔested. Borg (2000), pg. 248, for example, claims that simple demonstratives
cannot be used to produce donkey anaphoric readings, pointing out the infelicity of the string I bought a
donkey and had that vaccinated.
23While presenting this material at conferences, I have several times encountered the suggestion that the
right readings for sentences like (13) could be derived by claiming that the speakers have intentions that
involve pairs of all the possible addressees and (all oঌ?) their (possible?) pencils. डis does not seem like a
promising strategy.
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of simple demonstratives and the other expressions that they appear most similar to, i.e.,
pronouns. Although simple demonstratives do not always allow syntactic binding, the
cases inwhich they do not appear to admit of plausible explanation, and the cases inwhich
they do are naturally explicable if demonstratives are variables. Finally, variablism makes
the problem of donkey anaphoric readings of simple demonstratives seem tractable, while
the contextualist theory would have substantial di৳culties explaining the data.
3.2 Parsimony
Arguments from binding are the type of argument most frequently used to challenge
lexical semantic contextualism. Although I take those arguments to be successful, in my
view, an even more powerful class of considerations that tell against the position in fact
involve a failure of parsimony. In a nutshell, the problem is that on the lexical contextualist
view, instructions for ৱnding the referent of a demonstrative are encoded in its meaning.
But those instructions are instructions no reasonable interpreter would need: the relevant
constraints fall naturally out of the structure of the interpretive task people are faced
with when they encounter demonstratives. So, lexicalizing those constraints amounts to
unnecessary double-counting.
3.2.1 An argument by comparison with lexical ambiguity
One way to bring this point out is to consider an analogy with the phenomenon of lexical
ambiguity.24 Suppose you overhear an uऔerance of the following sentence:
(15) My friend Janna has been at the bank all day.
Which truth conditions should you associate with the sentence in this scenario? डat is,
which proposition should you take to have been asserted? डe answer here will clearly
depend on a number of factors. Your job as an interpreter is to weigh them up and come
to a decision about which hypothesis you think makes the most sense. Your degree of fa-
miliarity with the parties to the conversation and of the particular course it has taken so
far will be the most signiৱcant considerations. If you know the speaker, for example, and
know someone called ‘Janna’, and have reason to believe that the speaker would be saying
something about her, that information will point you in a certain direction. If you know
that Janna loves to ৱsh, that will increase the probability of your taking ‘bank’ to have
24See Neale (2005) for related discussion.
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been used to say something about a place by the water. If, however, (15) was immedi-
ately preceded by a complaint about poor customer service in the retail sub-sector of the
ৱnancial services industry, you may decide to approach the ambiguity diৰerently.
Of course, your semantic knowledge—your knowledge of the meaning (or meanings) of
the word (or words) ‘bank’—plays an important role in seऔing up the decision. If ‘bank’
meant what ‘restaurant’ means, you would not be in the position of choosing between
the two hypotheses that you in fact must choose between. It would be a mistake, how-
ever, to get carried away here and end up packing more into the semantics than is really
necessary.
Here is a simple and plausible story that we could tell about ‘bank’: there are really two
distinct lexical items—bank1 and bank2—one of which denotes the property of being a
certain kind of ৱnancial institution, and one the property of being a certain kind of place
by a river.25 When faced with a sentence involving the phonetic sequence we render as
‘bank’, interpreters rely on their general pragmatic competence to choose the lexical item
that would make the most sense in the context as they take it to be.26
Here is a complicated and implausible story we could tell about ‘bank’: there is just one
context-sensitive expression in the lexicon, that is associated with two distinct senses. It
is part of the lexical entry for that item that it picks out the side of a river, if that is what is
intended by the speaker of the context, or a ৱnancial institution, if that is what is intended
by the speaker of the context. Unlike either of the preceding analyses, a formal semantics
for this element would invoke the context parameter. Call the version of English that
invokes context-sensitivity in the lexical entry for ‘bank’ English′.
If English′ is a conceptual possibility, English′′ should be, too. On English′′, there are two
lexical items, bank1 and bank2, both of which are context-sensitive. Bank1 picks out the
property of being a certain kind of ৱnancial institution if that is what was intended by
the speaker of the context, while bank2 picks out the property of being a certain kind of
place by a river if that was what was intended by the speaker of the context.27
Wecan generate variations on English′ and English′′ by replacing ‘intended by the speaker
of the context’ with ‘would be the choice a typical speaker would make in the given con-
text’, and so on, along all of the various reference-resolving lines that have been proposed
25Familiar support for the idea of what wemight call a bona ৱde lexical ambiguity can be found in the fact
that in other languages, bank1 and bank2 are not homophonous. For present purposes, however, nothing
hangs on the question of whether this is in fact the best approach to lexical ambiguity.
26For related discussion, compare the case of the banker and the haberdasher from Kaplan (1970).
27डe point of building this context-sensitivity into the lexical entries for bank1 and bank2, of course, is
precisely that there is nothing to be gained by so doing.
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in the literature on demonstratives. Following Kripke (1977), we can think of each of these
possibilities as candidate hypotheses about the language we in fact speak; if we encoun-
tered someone speaking English′ or one of the permutations thereof, we would have no
trouble communicating.
Should we take this to show that ‘bank’ is context-sensitive? Is English′, or any of its
derivatives, actually the language we speak? Surely not! डe constraints that are lexi-
calized in English′ are constraints that we get for free by basic pragmatic reasoning. By
encoding those constraints in the semantics, we exchange a simpler theory for a more
complicated one that gains us no explanatory power.
Parallel considerations apply in the case of demonstratives. Although it is not completely
clear whether the view described in Kaplan (1977) would make an appeal to the speaker’s
gestures a part of the lexical meaning of ‘that’ or not—not least because it is not clear
how exactly Kaplan’s remarks about dthat should be extended to cover natural language—
many philosophers working in a broadly Kaplanian tradition appear to endorse the idea
that such appeals are a part of semantics proper. Consider Neale (1993: 108):
So although there are counterfactual considerations that preclude treating
‘that’ as equivalent to the ordinary deৱnite description ‘the thing I am demon-
strating’, it is not wholly unreasonable to suppose that something like this
description captures its character.
Compare Borg (2000: 241-242):
In this way the character of a complex demonstrative would be thought of
as embodying the complex meaning rule: and object, α, is the referent of an
uऔerance of “that F” iৰ: i. α is the object being demonstrated by the speaker
and ii. α satisৱes F.
Salmon (2002: 524) writes:
With respect to any context c, the (English) content of an occurrence of the
complex demonstrative ‘that’⌢NP is the demonstratum of the demonstration
assigned to that occurrence in c, provided: (i) there is such a demonstratum;
and (ii) NP applies to it with respect to c. Otherwise ‘that’⌢NPhas no content.
And Braun (2008: 63) holds that:
डe linguistic meaning of ‘that N ’ is a (partial) function from contexts to
semantic contents such that, for any context c, the value of the function is
the demonstratum of c, if the demonstratum satisৱes (in the world of c) the
semantic content of N in c.
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As I understand them, each of these theorists holds in one form or another that appeals to
things like the speaker’s intentions, her gestures, the objects to which she is visually at-
tending, etc., deserve to be codiৱed as part of the lexical entry for ‘that’.28 डis codiৱcation
essentially amounts to giving a treatment of ‘that’ which is like the treatment we gave
above for the English′ version of ‘bank’. If we want people to take a speaker to have said
something about a certain object, there is no reason to stipulate that the demonstrative
pick out the object intended by the speaker of the context, since that is precisely the out-
come we would predict if the demonstrative encoded no more information lexically than
that it should be a candidate referring expression, i.e., an expression with the semantic
type 〈e〉.
To see this, imagine another hypothetical variation on English, English*, for which we
stipulate that demonstratives work like free variables, i.e., that they encode no substantial
information lexically, beyond the fact that, if evaluated with regard to an appropriate
variable assignment, they pick out some object from the domain. How would we expect
people to use an expression like this? If I were to uऔer such an expression in a normal
communicative context—that is, a context in which you hear me, and want to know what
I am asserting, and know that what my expression contributes to the proposition I express
is an object, if it is anything at all (or: know that the extension of my expression, if deৱned,
is an object)—the nature of the interpretive task you face would impose precisely the
constraints that the classical semanticist would codify bymeans of the rules she associates
with demonstratives. But this suggests that English* is simply English.
If I am the one speaking, then of course you will aऔempt to discern what I am trying to
say, as opposed to some third party. If you know that I am saying something about an
individual, then of course you will aऔempt to discern which individual that is. Providing
you with instructions that tell you to proceed by applying the description ‘the individual
intended by the speaker’ to whichever context you take to be relevant is providing you
no substantive guidance at all. So, there is no point in building that description—or any
other—into the lexical entry for ‘that’.
डere is a coda to this argument: if there were lexicalized descriptions associated with
demonstratives, we would expect them to vary across languages. But they do not appear
to. To the best of my knowledge, while there are superৱcial variations across languages
that concern whether demonstratives may be used to refer to animate objects or not, or
that mark various scales of nearness and distance, there are no demonstratives that refer
28It is important to note that Salmon’s and Braun’s ‘demonstrata’ are not necessarily the objects ostended
by the speaker of the context. ‘Demonstration’, in each of their theories, is meant as a technical term that
encompasses a wide variety of ways in which an object might be ‘made available’ for demonstrative refer-
ence, including demonstrations, striking perceptual salience, and so on.
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to the object being focused on by the listener, say, or the object that was the center of
aऔention for the person who just walked by.29
3.2.2 Two arguments based on empirical work
Empirical work on language acquisition provides further support for the idea that lexi-
calized instructions for ৱnding the referent of a demonstrative would be super৲uous.30 In
an in৲uential paper aimed at explaining the preponderance of nouns in children’s lexical
inventories, Gilleऔe et al. (1999), describe what has come to be known as the ‘human sim-
ulation paradigm’. In its original instance, that paradigm involved experiments in which
college-aged participants were asked to watch video of parents playing with and speak-
ing to their toddlers.31 Each trial involved a target word, which was replaced by a beep or
by a nonsense ‘word’ in the audio source. Participants were asked to identify the missing
item, which varied across lexical category, relative frequency, and degree of concreteness
or ‘imageability’, among other things.
Repeated experiments show that in the case of nominal expressions—especially concrete
nominals, which Gilleऔe et al. call ‘highly imageable targets’—speakers are extremely
good at ৱlling in the blanks. डe authors’ explanation of this fact is that speakers are able
to identify which objects are at issue in a given context without the beneৱt of any of the
semantic clues that would be provided by the missing word. People do not need to hear
the word ‘lion’, that is, in order to recognize that a certain conversation revolves around
a lion, and once they see that it does, it is a short step to ৱlling in the missing word.
Gilleऔe et al. take their results to support a model of language acquisition on which chil-
dren learn what nouns mean by ৱrst identifying the contextually-present objects that are
the topics of a particular sentence or discourse, and then forming hypotheses about which
words correspond to those objects and about which of the objects’ features are the seman-
tically signiৱcant ones. Once a suitably dense network of nouns has been established in
this way, the relationships between them can be ৱlled in with verbs and expressions from
other categories.32
29See page 36 for further discussion.
30डanks to Daniel Rothschild for this suggestion and for discussion of it.
31Piccin & Waxman (2007) and others have reported results similar to Gilleऔe et al.’s, using variations
on the original experiment on which the participants were children (for Piccin and Waxman’s case, 7-year
olds). In any event, the fact that adult speakers have access to more sophisticated recovery strategies than
children do does not undermine the key point, which is that nouns are easier to recover than verbs and
expressions of other categories.
32डe primary aim of Gilleऔe et al. (1999) and much of Gleitman’s other work is to challenge the idea
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Suppose Gleitman et al. are right, and that the ৱrst step in acquiring a noun—and thereby,
in acquiring language at all—is ৱguring out which objects people are talking about in a
context.33 Of course, no one will want to say that toddlers determine which objects their
parents are talking about by engaging in full-blown second-order Gricean reasoning. Still,
even if the vocabulary of referential intentions is out of place, the kinds of skills the child
would rely on are precisely the skills that would be required to determine the referent of a
demonstrative using the instructions the lexical contextualist builds into the architecture
for demonstratives: the key to both enterprises will be the interpreter’s ability to track
a speaker’s gestures, the direction of her gaze, and so on. But if the model of language
learning described by Gilleऔe et al. is correct, those skills are likely to be perfectly general
ones, skills that are online in the background in every linguistic interaction anyway, and
indeed, presumably in any interaction with other agents. As such, codifying them in the
lexical semantics for a particular expression type would be redundant.
Even if Gilleऔe at al. are wrong about language acquisition, however, their experiments
are still relevant for us. Consider an example that replicates the authors’ paradigm. Imag-
ine that we are standing on Sargent’s Ridge on Mount Shasta at 12,000’ and the wind is
gusting at 70 miles per hour. I say, without pointing at a prominent rock feature that has
recently become visible in our direction of travel:
(16) डat’s the डumb—the hard part is almost over, but the weather looks bad. We
should probably head down.
Because of the wind you hear only:
(17) (unintelligible)’s the डumb—the hard part is almost over, but the weather looks
bad. We should probably head down.
In cases like this one—I imagine nearly everyone will agree—the fact that you cannot hear
the demonstrative has no eৰect on your ability to understand what I wanted to get across.
One way of explaining this would be to say that you recognize that a word is missing,
determine that it must have been ‘that’ (by relying on what you know about syntax,
that it is children’s underdeveloped conceptual repertoire that results in their comparatively impoverished
verb inventory. On their view, this is due instead to the fact that is that verbs and expressions from other
lexical categories require a higher degree of support from a background linguistic network anchored in
nouns, which are easier to acquire directly from the extra-linguistic context.
33For a sustained discussion of the issues involved in this picture of language acquisition, compare
Bloom (2000). I assume that there are ways of cashing out ‘ৱguring out which objects…’ that do not in-
volve metacognition.
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frequency, prosody, etc.), consult the lexicon, see that ‘that’ picks out the object intended
by the speaker of the context, and then arrive at a hypothesized interpretation.
डe Gilleऔe et al. experiments, however, support our common sense intuitions, which
put the key step in the explanation the other way around. If the mechanism they propose
is correct, you see that a nominal item is missing, and you see, from the extra-linguistic
context, which object is at issue. If you are asked which word I must have uऔered, you will
likely be able to identify ‘that’ correctly, but the direction of the reconstructed inference
will be from the object to the missing word, and not vice-versa.
Since access to the lexical semantic properties of ‘that’ is not required for you to identify
the object that you would associate with the expression had you heard it correctly, it is
hard to see what work could be leऑ for those properties to play, even in normal circum-
stances. Put diৰerently, if the missing word from the Gilleऔe et al. experiments were a
demonstrative, the process interpreters would use to resolve its reference would be ex-
actly the same as the process they would use if the demonstrative were pronounced and
had the lexical semantics classical theories aऔribute it. But this is a reason to doubt that
there is any genuine reference-determining work for the lexical semantics to do.
Of course, the fact that our general interpretive ability allows us to successfully recover
reference in the absence of semantic cues does not imply that there is no substantial infor-
mation encoded in the semantics for some expression. Youmay rely on the same resources
to determine that ‘tiger’ is the word missing in one context as you to do determine that
‘bear’ is missing in another, but this does not mean that we should say ‘tiger’ and ‘bear’
mean the same thing.34
Where common nouns are concerned, it is easy to halt this slide, since there is more to un-
derstanding a common noun than knowing which object it picks out on a given occasion.
It is an important part of knowing the meaning of ‘tiger’ that you understand which prop-
erties are shared by the various objects the word might be used to talk about; we can see
this by noticing that these are the properties that ৱgure in predicative uses of the word.
In the case of demonstrative expressions, however, the standard lexical contextualist line
has always been that the expression contributes nothing but an object to the determina-
tion of the truth conditions of the sentences in which it appears. So, unlike in the case of
a common noun, the fact that it makes no diৰerence whether an interpreter hears ‘that’
or not suggests the word has no genuine lexical semantic contribution to make.35
34डanks are due to an anonymous referee for urging clarity about this point.
35डere is a caveat to be entered here regarding the diৰerence between e.g. ‘this’ and ‘that’, but this
caveat could be implemented without substantially changing the story oৰered here. See 7.2 for discussion.
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In summary, the empirical research discussed here provides two reasons to think that
lexical semantic contextualism is not a parsimonious position. First, it is plausible that
the instructions for resolving reference that the lexical contextualist builds into the se-
mantics for demonstratives are skills that underlie language acquisition. If this is right,
we should not expect to ৱnd those skills encoded in the lexical entry for any particular
expression, since theywill presumably be globally accessible. Second, even if language ac-
quisition does not work the way the Gilleऔe et al. think it does, their experiments provide
us a reason to doubt that hearers would have to access substantive constraints from the
lexicon in order to solve the kind of reference resolution task that demonstratives pose.
डe only information we need to solve the question of reference is information to the
eৰect that a certain constituent is a referential one to begin with. डat information—and
nothing more—is precisely what the variablist semantic treatment provides for demon-
stratives.
4 Parametric contextualism
I take the arguments from the previous section to establish two things. First, treating
demonstratives as variables at the level of the compositional semantics would allow us to
tell the best story about data involving binding. Second, there is no compelling reason to
treat demonstratives as though they encode substantive reference-ৱxing rules of the type
that have typically been supposed. Together, I take these points to show that we should
treat demonstratives as variables, their extensions ৱxed not by the context of uऔerance,
but by an assignment function.36 डis leaves us with a question: how do we explain the
intuitive data we started with? How, that is, do we explain the fact that ordinary speaker
intuitions about the truth conditions of demonstrative sentences appear to depend on the
contexts in which those sentences are uऔered?
Lewis (1980) oৰered a way of answering questions like this one. Lewis took the fact that
natural languages make use of operators like ‘forevermore’ and ‘necessarily’ to show that
semantic values must be relative to parameters more ৱne-grained than context.
Under one disambiguation, ‘If someone is speaking here, then I exist.’ is true
at any context whatever. No shiऑ from one context to another can make it
false. But a time shiऑ, holding other features ৱxed, can make it false; that
is why ‘Forevermore, if someone is speaking here, then I will exist.’ is false
36डanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out that the parsimony argument by itself does not su৳ce
to establish variablism—other ‘minimalist’ semantic treatments might be compatible with that argument.
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in the original context. Likewise a world shiऑ can make it false; that is why
‘Necessarily, if someone is speaking here then I must exist.’ is false in the
original context. डe shiऑs that make the sentence false must not be shiऑs
from one context to another. (Lewis 1980: 86)
In Lewis’ terms, we need index sensitivity in addition to context sensitivity because there
are natural language operators that cannot reasonably be treated as aৰecting permuta-
tions of the context of uऔerance. But Lewis accepted that a semantic theory should have
an important role to play in explaining how people are able to communicate with one
another. So, he wanted to show how speakers could use index sensitive semantic values
to express propositions—i.e,. something that might represent the sort of information that
is at stake in a conversation. Here is what he proposed:
[We do not] need to equate the propositional content and the semantic value
of a sentence in a context. It is enough that the assignment of semantic values
should somehow determine the assignment of propositional content. And it
does…we have the relation: sentence s is true at context c at index i. From
that we can deৱne the propositional content of sentence s in context c as that
proposition that is true at world w iৰ s is true at c at the index iwc that results
if we take the index ic of the context c and shiऑ its world coordinate to w.
(Lewis 1980: 94)
डe notion that does the crucial work here is the notion of the index of a context. Contexts,
for Lewis, are triples formed from a time, a place, and a possible world. Indices, he says,
are n-tuples formed from features of contexts. While not every index is the index of a
context—we can construct an index by mashing together arbitrary features drawn from
diৰerent contexts—every context is such that an index can be constructed from the time,
place, and possible world that make it up.
Consider the sentence:
(18) Socrates is currently siऔing.
Intuitively, when uऔered on June 14, 2016, sentence (18) conveys the information that
Socrates is siऔing on June 14, 2016. Lewis’ idea that contexts determine indices allows us
to explain that intuition without having to say that the semantic value of the sentence in
that context is the proposition that Socrates is siऔing on June 14, 2016. In Lewis’ terms, the
context of uऔerance ‘initializes’ the index with regard to which a sentence is interpreted.
Since time is one of the parameters of the index, Lewis can say the semantic value of the
sentence in the context is a function from times (or richer indices) to propositions.
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Many people think that in addition to Lewis’ world, time, and location, contexts determine
an assignment of values to variables.37 Heim & Kratzer (1998: 243), for example, use the
variable assignment to model the kinds of facts classical contextualists aim to capture in
their lexical semantics:
Let us think of assignments as representing the contribution of the uऔerance
situation.डe physical and psychological circumstances that prevail when an
LF is processed will (if the uऔerance is felicitous) determine an assignment
to all the free variables occurring in the LF.
One time-slice of Kaplan (1989: 591) says:
Context is a package of whatever parameters are needed to determine the
referent, and thus the content, of the directly referential expressions of the
language…Taking context in this more abstract, formal way, as providing the
parameters needed to generate content, it is natural to treat the assignment of
values to free occurrences of variables as simply one more aspect of context.
And Cumming (2008: 540-541) writes:
It is standard—since Kaplan (1989: 541-553)—for a context of uऔerance c to
provide a possible world, cw. I further suppose that it provides a variable as-
signment, cg. Kaplan (1989: 591), building on the work of Montague (1974),
suggests this reৱnement himself to handle deictic pronouns (which are se-
mantically represented as free variables). डe variable assignment of the con-
text, on Kaplan’s account, models deictic reference: it is a function from de-
ictic uses of pronouns to demonstrated objects (the referents of those uses).
Rabern (2012a) shows howwe can explain the intuitive data about demonstratives by com-
bining a variablist semantics for demonstratives with the claim that variable assignments
are one of the parameters that is determined by context. डe result is a parametrized form
of contextualism, on which the semantic value of a demonstrative sentence in a context
is assignment sensitive, and thus not the sort of thing ordinary speakers have intuitions
about. डe proposition expressed by a demonstrative sentence in a context, however, will
be just what the classical contextualist would predict—the proposition you get when you
evaluate the demonstrative sentence in question with regard to the variable assignment
of the context.
So, for example, if you uऔer:
37डanks to Brian Rabern for extensive discussion of this point and the consequences.
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(19) डat is not a safe place to ski aऑer a big storm.
while pointing at Shasta, the variablist represents your uऔerance in the compositional
semantics using something we might put informally as:
(20) x is not a safe place to ski aऑer a big storm.
डe semantic value of (19) in a context, then, is not a proposition, but a function from
variable assignments to propositions. If we evaluate the sentence in the context described,
however, we end up with the proposition that Shasta is not a safe place to ski aऑer a big
storm, since that context supplies an assignment function that maps x to Shasta.
Parametric contextualism represents a signiৱcant advance over classical thinking about
demonstratives. By making demonstrative expressions semantically sensitive not to the
context of uऔerance, but to a variable assignment, we put ourselves in a position to neatly
handle the problems canvassed earlier, as well as to oৰer an elegant treatment of deferred
ostension and other phenomena. By dividing the task of explaining the intuitions elicited
by demonstratives into separate semantic and post-semantic components, we do justice
to the divergent aims and requirements of a compositional theory and a broader theory
of language use, while respecting the important sense in which the laऔer must be shaped
by the former.38
Despite these advantages, however, I take parametric contextualism to inherit a substan-
tial defect from classical semantic contextualism. डat defect is a commitment to the idea
that demonstrative sentences in a context express a single proposition. What we might
call ‘monism about content’ is not required to explain the intuitive data about demon-
stratives, and dispensing with the thesis allows us to give a beऔer treatment of those
data.
5 Conࣽicting intuitions about content
As we saw earlier, if we conৱne our aऔention to the most familiar kinds of cases involv-
ing demonstratives, the claim that a context of uऔerance determines a single proposition
seems plausible enough—if someone uऔers (21) while pointing at Mount Shasta and in-
tending to refer to the mountain, for example, we have seen how even the simplest lexical
contextualist theories will make unsurprising predictions:
38As Lewis (1980), Stanley (1997), MacFarlane (2014), Yalcin (2007, 2014), Ninan (2010), Rabern (2012a,b),
and others have urged.
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(21) डat is the tallest point in Shasta County.
डeories based on a speaker’s ostensive gestures will say that Shasta was the semantic
value of the demonstrative in question, and thus that the proposition expressed concerned
Shasta. डeories based on a speaker’s referential intentions will issue in the same result.
It seems clear enough that in the case described, the person who uऔers (21) has in some
fairly central sense said something about Shasta, so even before we decide exactly what
‘saying’ amounts to, what a proposition is, or which features of context are the content-
determining ones, there is likely to be liऔle to quarrel with here.
When we turn our aऔention towards more complicated cases, however, the idea that
demonstrative sentences can be associated with a single intuitive content becomes less
easy to sustain. Any number of classic examples from the philosophical literature on
demonstratives can be used to bring this point out. Imagine, for instance, along the lines
of Reimer (1991), that a speaker raises her arm to point out her dog, and just as she uऔers
(22), a bear leaps out of some bushes and runs in the way:
(22) डat is my dog.
A contextualist theory built around a speaker’s ostensive gestures, which seemed to work
well in the case involving Shasta, predicts that this person will have expressed the propo-
sition that the bear in question is her dog. But this a bizarre result. If a third party should
later ask ‘DidMary tell youwhich dogwas hers? I heard shewas planning on telling you…’
no reasonable listener would respond ‘Mary is weird. She said a bear is her dog.’39
A normal person would look past the gesture and report that what the speaker expressed
in the context described was a proposition about her dog. Many philosophers have taken
cases like this to show that a speaker’s referential intentions, not her gestures, are what
contextualism should track;40 the reason we have the sense that this speaker said some-
thing about her dog, presumably, is that we can see that it was her dog that she had in
mind while speaking.
Contextualist theories based on a speaker’s referential intentions, however, are suscepti-
ble to counter-examples of the same genre. Consider the famous case from Kaplan (1970)
39Although it is worth noticing that a child, or an annoying pedantic person might well say as much—it
is not that this interpretation is ruled out, so much as that it is not an interpretation that is available to
people who are well-behaved conversational participants.
40Compare Kaplan (1989), Bach (1992), and King (2001), among others.
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in which someone uऔers (23) while pointing at a picture of Spiro Agnew with the inten-
tion to say something about Rudolf Carnap:41
(23) डat is a picture of the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.
A theorist who wants to defend the idea that the propositional contribution of a demon-
strative in a context is the object ostended by the speaker of the context will claim that
intuitively, someone who used (23) in the context described would be saying something
false about (a picture oঌ) Agnew. डe theorist might bolster that intuition by inviting us
to take up the audience’s perspective; she could ask us, for example, to pretend that we
enter a room and see a stranger pointing at a picture of Agnew while uऔering (23). What
else could we hope to recover in such a case but a proposition about Agnew? From here it
is supposed to be a short step to the conclusion that the best explanation of our intuition
is a contextualist theory that maps contexts to the object ostended by the speaker of the
context.
If we accept the intuitions marshaled by the cases we have just looked at, we ৱnd our-
selves in a bind.डere are intuitive data that are handled beऔer by the gesture-based view
than the speaker-intention view, and intuitive data that are handled beऔer by the speaker-
intention view than the gesture-based view. But the views are mutually exclusive: they
specify diৰerent conditions under which an object qualiৱes as the propositional contri-
bution of a demonstrative in a context, which means that other things being equal, they
predict that diৰerent propositions will be expressed by (23) in the context described.
Actually, the situation is somewhat trickier than this. It is not just that there are cases that
pull us one way, and cases that pull us another. In fact, most of the devious cases can be
used to argue for either of the contrary positions. Consider the Carnap/Agnew example
again. We have just seen how that example can be deployed to support the view that
ostensive gestures determine the reference of a demonstrative. But someone who thinks
that a speaker’s referential intentions are what maऔer can use the same case to support
her view as well.
Instead of focusing on the audience’s reaction, this theorist will urge us to adopt the
perspective of the speaker as we survey our intuitions. Suppose, to bring those intuitions
into focus, that the speech act involving (23) occurs in a hypothetical society from the
distant future in which it is considered heretical to accuse a politician of high-mindedness.
Now imagine that it was you that uऔered (23)! If someonewho overheard the conversation
41Imagine, furthermore, if the details seem relevant, that the speaker sincerely believes the picture is a
picture of Carnap, and that the audience has no reason to think anything strange is going on.
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accused you of blasphemy, you would presumably defend yourself by saying: ‘But that’s
not what I said at all—Carnap is the person I had in mind, not Agnew!’ To the extent
that you ৱnd yourself receptive to this intuition, you are supposed to be pushed in the
direction of a version of contextualism that maps contexts to the object intended by the
speaker of the context.
Some contextualists have concluded that tricky cases reveal the need for a more sophis-
ticated approach. Instead of a unilateral view based on a speaker’s intentions, or on her
gestures, these philosophers think a balance must be struck between possibly divergent
perspectives. King (2014), for example, oৰers what he calls a ‘coordination account’ of
demonstratives, on which the weight given to a speaker’s referential intentions is set
against the requirement that those intentions be transparent enough for interpreters to
recognize them. King says that:
डe semantic value of a use of a demonstrative d in a context c is that object
o that meets the following two conditions: (1) the speaker intends o to be the
value of d in c; and (2) a competent, aऔentive, reasonable hearer who knows
the common ground of the conversation at the time of uऔerance would know
that the speaker intends o to be the value of d in c. (King 2014: 102)
On King’s view, the question of which object should count as the referent of a demon-
strative, if there is a referent, is entirely seऔled by the speaker’s intentions. By building
the perspective of a hypothetical audience into the semantics, however, King introduces
a new way in which reference might be defeated (and thus secures a way to explain why
this kind of case seems tricky). डe solipsism of the ostensive and the speaker-intentional
views is replaced here by the idea that a demonstrative in a context will only have a de-
ৱned semantic value—and thus, ৱgure in the determination of a proposition—if it has a
reasonable chance of serving as a vehicle for communicating that value.
डis proposal is meant to allow us to reject the choice between (24) and (25) that the other
two proposals would force:
(24) डe speaker said that Agnew was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth cen-
tury.
(25) डe speaker said that Carnap was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth cen-
tury.
by adding a third hypothesis to the range of possibilities:
(26) डe speaker failed to say anything at all.
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While it would admiऔedly be bad to have to choose between (24) and (25) in describing
what happens in the Carnap/Agnew case, in my view, the di৳culty is not avoided by
adding (26) to the mix. डe problem with the choice is not that neither option describes
the case accurately, it is that there is a sense in which each gets something importantly
right. King’s view misses this point in the same way as the views it is meant to improve
on, by forcing us to say that just one from among the range of intuitions elicited should
be taken more seriously than the rest.
Like the other views we have considered, King’s is designed to set out the conditions
under which a certain proposition should count as having been expressed by a demon-
strative sentence in a context. But his view is no less susceptible to counter-examples than
those views; it is not di৳cult to set up cases on which intuitively, we think that a certain
proposition would be expressed, although King says none is.
Consider what a proposal like King’s will predict about the following case. Imagine that a
shaman and her vision-quest protégé are navigating through some deep rainforest. Under
the in৲uence of the powerful combination of psychotropic plants and sincere religious
convictions, the forest appears to them to be even fuller of animal life than it in fact
is. A certain fern appears to both travelers as a serpent-headed jaguar, and the shaman
says:
(27) Do you see that? It is a very powerful spirit—we must approach it with great care.
You go around to the leऑ, and I will go to the right, and that way we will be safe.
Now suppose that no one but the shaman and her protégé would be in a position to have
understood which object the shaman was referring to. To an ordinary observer, even one
from the same spiritual community, the forest looks like a more-or-less undiৰerentiated
mass of foliage. But the protégé understands immediately which object the shaman had
in mind, and the two take diverging paths around it, moving carefully through the for-
est.
On King’s view, no proposition would be expressed in this scenario, since being aऔentive,
competent, and reasonable is not enough to allow you to determine which ferns might
appear to be jaguars.42 It hardly seems plausible to deny, however, that in a fairly central
42डere is room for debate here. King suggests, for example, that to properly count as knowing the
common ground of the conversation, someone might have to be in a perceptual state broadly similar to that
of the shaman and the protégé, i.e, too see a jaguar in the ferns. He also notes that what counts as aऔentive,
competent, and reasonable might change over contexts; maybe you have to have consumed ayahuasca or
similar to count as reasonable in a case like this one. For a more detailed presentation of this kind of case,
and a response to this kind of potential reply on King’s behalf, see Nowak & Michaelson (2019).
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sense of ‘saying something’, the shaman has said something perfectly determinate. Of
course, you might think that what she said was false—there is no serpent-headed jaguar,
there is only a fern. But is there any reason to think that she fails to refer to the fern,
just because she takes it to be something else? Surely the requirement that a speaker
know which sortal an object falls under would be an unreasonably high bar to place on
reference.43
In case the non-veridical perception involved in the example muddies the water, con-
sider a variation that preserves the relevant features. Anecdotal evidence from YouTube
suggests that twins are capable of extraordinary feats of linguistic coordination. It is not
hard to imagine that twins, who know each other uncommonly well, would be able to
coordinate their activities using demonstratives in perceptual environments that would
be impossible for other speakers. On the simplest interpretation of King’s view, however,
such coordination would not entail that a twin speaker in such an environment count as
having expressed any proposition, since a normal interpreter would not have been able
to track the same objects as her twin interpreters.
Finally, consider cases in which coordination on an object obtains, but not due to any
competence of the interpreter or helpful input from the speaker. Imagine, for example,
that a certain interpreter focuses her aऔention on the same objects as a speaker over
some interval thanks to carefully-orchestrated third-party neurophysiological interven-
tions. (Or miraculous interventions, or even dumb luck, if you think careful coordination
undermines the example.) Every time the speaker uses a demonstrative, the interpreter
tracks the object the speaker intended to refer to, although the speaker does nothing to
secure this coordination.44 We can imagine such an interpreter helping such a speaker
to repair a car, or perform surgery, by handing the speaker tools or performing actions
on cue. For King, however, the joint activity here is secured without the expression of
any propositions, since an ordinary interpreter would have no idea what do to with the
speaker’s demonstrative sentences.45
In each of these cases, the typical hallmarks of communication are present; information
43Although compare discussion from Ayers (1974), Dickie (2011), Goodman (2012), and others.
44We do not need to assume that the speaker is being willfully uncooperative in doing nothing; we might
imagine that she sincerely wishes she could do something, but is unable to because she is unable to move,
or physically distant from the listener, and so on. We might imagine, too, that she wrongly takes herself
to be providing useful interpretive information to the listener, say, by gesturing, without realizing that the
listener does not see her gestures.
45Michaelson (2013) discusses cases similar to these, although he takes them towork the opposite way, i.e.,
to show that the mere fact of coordination between a speaker and a hearer is not su৳cient for a proposition
to count as having been expressed. Compare his note 24, pg. 54.
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is proৰered, uptake is secured, and joint activity proceeds in a coordinated way. But in
each case, King’s view issues in the counter-intuitive prediction that no proposition is
expressed. In other words, there are cases for King on which a proposition is expressed
although communication fails, and cases in which no proposition is expressed, although
the speaker in fact succeeds in communicating. If the point of the theory is to make the
semantic value of a demonstrative sentence in a context match the content we intuitively
take to have been expressed, this should be an unacceptable result.
Someone determined to ৱnd a mapping from contexts to the propositions intuitively ex-
pressed in them might take the examples I have oৰered to suggest focusing on the ac-
tual states of mind of the participants in the conversation, instead of the speaker’s state
and the state she could reasonably have expected her hearer to seऔle upon.46 If we say
that a proposition is expressed when de facto communication occurs—when both the
speaker and the audience track the same object—we can make the right intuitive predic-
tions about the cases just surveyed, as well as maintaining the result King wanted for the
Carnap/Agnew case, i.e., that no proposition be expressed.
But this option does not really move the ball forward. In fact, King himself oৰers an ex-
cellent reason for rejecting it. King says that making de facto communication the key
to determining whether or not a proposition was expressed places implausible limits on
when speakers count as saying something. If you only count as expressing a proposition
when you succeed in communicating, then your ability to express propositions will de-
pend on whether your audience is paying aऔention to you, or indeed, whether you have
an audience at all.47
Accepting the force of King’s objection, however, does not mean that we should fall back
and accept his positive proposal. What the objection reveals is a sense in which King—and
everyone else with a contextualist theory—is stuck trying to navigate a course between
two poles. On the one hand, they need a theory that does justice to our sense that contents
re৲ect speakers’ mental states—what Michaelson (2016, 2019) calls ‘expressive uses’ of
46Compare Speaks (2016), for example.
47An anonymous referee points out that there is room here for someone who identiৱes the proposition
expressed in a context with the proposition in fact communicated, if there is one, to respond to this worry.
Such a theorist, for example, might treat cases in which no one is paying aऔention as cases of self-talk,
and analyze self-talk as though it involved successful communication. डere is no space here to consider
all the branches in the argument tree that would result from such a move; Eliot Michaelson and I take up
some of them in our Nowak & Michaelson (2019). डe basic thrust of our argument there is that the notion
of communication that seems to be at work in e.g. Speaks and King does not seem to be obviously met in
cases of self-directed speech. See Grice (1969), especially pp. 174-177 for related discussion, and Michaelson
(2019) for criticism.
28
demonstratives.48 On the other hand, they need a theory that does justice to our intuition
that contents must be accessible to interpreters as well. (Otherwise, we end up with a
humpty-dumpty theory of content.) डe crude theories we began with ended up biting
one or the other bullet here; the ostensive theory went all in on what is available to the
audience, the speaker-intentional theory went the other way, emphasizing the priority of
the speaker’s state of mind. While theories like King’s try to balance the claims, the result
is unstable, ignoring now one intuition, now the other.
6 Pluralism about demonstrative contents
डe discussion from the previous section shows that in many cases, there is no single
proposition that is apt to ৱll all the roles philosophers expect the content associated with
a demonstrative uऔerance in a context to ৱll. Some of our intuitions about content are best
captured by the propositionwewould get if we took the speaker’s referential intentions to
determine the referent of a demonstrative. Others are best captured by the proposition we
would get if we took the speaker’s gestures to be key. Sometimes, it seems like we reserve
the locution ‘the proposition expressed’ to track those propositions that are coordinated
upon by both the speaker and the hearer, and it is not hard to imagine intuitions that
would be best modeled by other propositions besides these.
If we accept that the best semantic analysis of demonstratives involves treating them
as variables, the con৲icting intuitions about ‘what is said’ by way of a demonstrative
uऔerance in a context can be handled in three ways. First, we might take the con৲ict
to show that another round of iterative changes to the basic parametric contextualist
framework is required. We could conclude, that is, that although current state of the art
stories about how the context initializes a particular variable assignment are not quite
good enough to match all of our intuitions, a future story might do beऔer. Although
I know of no conclusive argument against this possibility, I take the intuitive data to
suggest that some of our intuitions are simply incompatible.49 डat, together with the
fact that philosophers’ long history of work in this area has not resulted in a theory that
ৱts all of the intuitive data, constitutes a reason for pessimism. In any case, I will have
nothing further to say about this option.
डe second strategy we might take in the face of con৲icting intuitions would be to main-
48Compare Heck (2014) on ‘Child with a Dove’.
49On the assumption, that is, that just one proposition is expressed by a demonstrative sentence in a
context.
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tain that one or another parametric contextualist treatment is correct, while oৰering an
error theory to explain away the data the parametric theory does not ৱt well. On the
face of things, this would appear to be a plausible option. Hard cases, as the saying goes,
make bad law, and there will certainly be philosophers who will think the simplest way
of dealing with them would be to point out that a proposition can be ‘put in play’ for an
agent without its being the content of an assertion (say).50
Imagine, for example, that we endorse a parametric contextualist view on which contexts
initialize a variable assignment that tracks the object demonstrated by the speaker of the
context. डat would allow us to directly explain the intuition that the speaker in the Car-
nap/Agnew case says something about Agnew. But, by making the speaker’s gestures the
determinant of demonstrative reference, our story would miss out the intuition that the
speaker says something about Carnap. On the error theoretic approach, we would explain
that laऔer intuition by invoking a weaker sense in which a proposition can be ‘activated’
in a context. For example, we might point to the diৰerence between the proposition ex-
pressed in a context, on the one hand, and the proposition that a certain agent took to
have been expressed, on the other. Or we might invoke Kripke’s (1977) distinction be-
tween speaker’s reference and semantic reference.
One problemwith the strategy of picking some data to explain and others to explain away
is that it is available to philosophers on both sides of the traditional divide in the literature
on demonstratives. So, philosophers who think that the speaker’s intentions determine
the referents of her demonstratives can avail themselves of it just as easily as those who
think her gestures are the key. डis means that all of the old (and seemingly intractable)
debates about whi࠼ features of a context are the reference-determining ones recur if we
rely on an error theory in the complicated cases.51
डe real challenge for the error-theoretic approach, however, is that it depends on a sub-
stantial assumption that has not been subjected to appropriate scrutiny and which is not
obviously warranted: the assumption that when a demonstrative sentence is used in a
context, it will determine a unique proposition if it determines any proposition at all. A
comment from Speaks (2017: 720) illustrates the prevailing aऔitude among philosophers
nicely:
डough opinions diৰer about the right thing to say about the case of Carnap
50डanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point, which Eliot Michaelson, Daniel Rothschild, and
Robert Stainton have also made in conversation.
51Of course, if there were no theory available that promised to transcend these debates, this would not
by itself constitute a reason for rejecting an error theory. As we will see, however, there is such an option
on the table, which makes the error theory less aऔractive.
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& Agnew, we can all agree that in that scenario the demonstrative does not
refer to both the picture of Carnap and the picture of Agnew.
Although this may be a fair assessment of the state of the literature, it is not clearwhy we
should assume that (someone’s use oঌ) a demonstrative could not pick out both Carnap
and Agnew. In the early days of work on demonstratives, when it seemed plausible that an
adequate compositional semantic treatment would take a felicitous uऔerance and deliver
a determinate proposition (take a demonstrative and return its extension), this kind of
monism about content (reference) would have appeared to be a natural consequence of
the shape of any of the extant semantic alternatives.
Once we recognize that the best compositional semantic theories do not in fact tra৳c in
propositions (referents), however, we can no longer aৰord to treat monism about contents
(reference) as an assumption that requires no defense. Since the best semantic story for
demonstratives is one that massively underdetermines propositional contents, by mas-
sively underdetermining the referents of demonstratives, someone who wants to claim
that there is just one way in which a proposition can come to count as the proposition
expressed by a demonstrative sentence in a context should be expected to oৰer not just a
description of a mechanism that maps contexts to propositions, but an argument that es-
tablishes that that mapping serves an explanatory project that is more fundamental than
any of the others in the vicinity. Friends of contextualism have not generally acknowl-
edged this challenge, let alone oৰered arguments that would meet it.52
Until they do, the default response to the problematic data about demonstratives should
be to take up what I see as the third possible strategy: pluralism about demonstrative
reference, and thus about demonstrative contents. Instead of holding out hope for some
future synthesis that resolves the con৲icting intuitions, or embracing one set of intu-
itions at the cost of the other, we should take the intuitive data at face value and say
that a single demonstrative sentence, used in a context, might express more than one
proposition.
In my view, the real philosophical signiৱcance of the variablist compositional semantics
for demonstratives lies in the fact that it allows us a natural way of having our cake, with
regard to the cases that generate con৲icting intuitions, and eating it, too. Instead of being
forced to choose between the context’s initializing the Carnap assignment or the Kaplan
assignment, or avoiding the choice by saying that neither a proposition about Carnap
nor a proposition about Agnew was expressed, variablism oৰers us a way to reject the
demand that we match contexts of uऔerance with a single proposition in the ৱrst place.
By evaluating the same sentence with regard to diৰerent assignments, we might hope to
52Bach (1992) and Michaelson (2016) are exceptions.
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make sense of the intuition that our speaker expresses a proposition involving Carnap,
and also the intuition that she expresses a proposition involving Agnew.
If we give up the idea that demonstrative sentences in a context should be associated with
a single proposition, of course, we invite the question of how many propositions a sen-
tence should be associated with, and how those propositions are determined.53 Although
a detailed consideration of the comparative merits of various responses will have to wait
for another paper, it will be worth taking a moment to sketch some of the natural options,
and to look at some of the challenges they will face.
One way of implementing the idea that a single use of a demonstrative sentence might
be associated with diৰerent propositions would be to embrace a form of relativism about
content. We might, for example, follow the general contours of the framework developed
in MacFarlane (2014), distinguishing contexts of use, cu, from contexts of assessment, ca,
and claiming that demonstratives are evaluated not with regard to a variable assignment
initialized by the context of use, but by the context of assessment.54
Suppose, to illustrate the point with a toy proposal, that we said that contexts of assess-
ment are structured around an assessor, and that the variable assignment initialized in a
context of assessment is one that maps i (the default index associated with a demonstra-
tive) to the object the assessor takes the speaker of the context of use to have intended to
refer to.
डis proposal wouldmake it easy to see how the con৲icting intuitions about the Carnap/Agnew-
type cases could be explained. Although there is a single context of use at stake, there are
two distinct contexts of assessment—the one in which the speaker of cu is the assessor
(let this be ca1), and the one in which the hearer of cu is the assessor (let this be ca2). डe
speaker in cu takes himself to be talking about Carnap, so with regard to the assignment
initialized by ca1 , the proposition he asserts is a proposition about Carnap. डe hearer of
cu, on the other hand, takes the speaker of cu to be talking about Agnew, so the assignment
initialized by ca2 returns a proposition about Carnap.
My own inclination is to think that we would be best served by endorsing a kind of
53An anonymous referee wonders whether, instead of talking about the variable assignment of a context,
we might take contexts to initialize a set of assignments. A story like this would allow us to endorse a form
of pluralism, without giving up on the idea that there is a fact of the maऔer about which contents are
expressed in a context. A full response will have to wait for another day, but I sketch one worry in section
7.1.
54To be clear: MacFarlane’s claims concern predicates of personal taste, epistemic modals, standards of
precision, and similar expressions, and not demonstratives. His aim is to defend a form of relativism about
truth values, not about content.
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instrumentalist position. Since variable assignments are cheap, we can use them to model
whatever wewant. Instead of asking ‘does this context determine this assignment (among
possibly others)?’ we should ask ‘is there some interesting explanatory project that would
be furthered by using this assignment to evaluate the demonstrative that was tokened in
this context?’
On this kind of approach, instead of saying that g is the variable assignment (or one of
the assignments) determined by c, we might say that if g is useful in representing the
object-directedness of the state of mind a certain agent from c is in while considering a
demonstrative sentence, then we should use g for that purpose. Some other assignment,
f, might be the most illuminating representation of the directed state of mind of some
other agent. We might use various assignments to track the objects that the agents who
are in fact involved in a certain conversation would aऔend to, if they were idealized in
certain respects. And we might use assignments to track any number of other things,
besides.
Of course, to properly explore the consequences of endorsing one of these views would
require substantial further work. I hope the considerations oৰered here so far, however,
will go some way towards making clear that where demonstratives are concerned, there
are theoretical options available that have so far not been recognized. डe true signiৱ-
cance of variablism might not lie in its superiority as a treatment of demonstratives at
the level of the compositional semantics, but in the fact that it allows us a natural way of
moving beyond the question of how to pair contexts with the proposition a demonstrative
sentence would express in them.
7 Loose ends
I hope the arguments advanced so far will convince readers that a form of pluralism about
demonstrative contents implemented using variables in the compositional semantics is an
aऔractive possibility. Before closing, I would like to address two outstanding issues that I
suspect readers will be likely to wonder about.
7.1 ࠭antiࣼcation
If the arguments given here so far are good, we should avoid claiming that contexts initial-
ize a canonical variable assignment. For one thing, we do not need a canonical assignment
to make sense of the intuitive demonstrative data. For another, a canonical assignment
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would undermine the kind of pluralism we have argued for here. डere is a third reason,
however, for thinking that it would be beऔer not to endorse a principle linking contexts
and variable assignments. In a nutshell, the reason is that such a link does not fall naturally
out of the standard justiৱcation we give for thinking that semantic evaluation involves
assignment-sensitivity.
Linguists and philosophers typically hold that semantic evaluation occurs with regard
to a parameter for the variable assignment because the machinery of variables and as-
signments oৰers a straightforward analysis of quantiৱcation. Recall the familiar seman-
tics we give for quantiৱers in ৱrst-order logic. In order to determine whether a sentence
like:
(28) ∀xFx
is true with regard to some domain, we check to see whether the open sentence:
(29) Fx
is true on every assignment of individuals from the domain to x.
Essentially the same procedure, adapted to meet the constraints of compositionality, is
used in the standard analysis of natural language. Drawing together threads from Frege
(1879/1997), Tarski (1944), Lewis (1970), and Montague (1973), it is customary to treat
quantiৱers as functions that take property-denoting arguments and return functions from
properties to truth values (in the industry jargon, functions of type 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉). डe stan-
dard implementation of this idea relies on the claim that there are operators in natural
languages that shiऑ the assignment with regard to which their complements are evalu-
ated, so that sentences like:
(30) Every kingi cherishes that cleric who crowned himi.
turn out to be true with regard to a domain just in case every assignment of values to x1
that satisৱes:
(31) x1 is a king
is also an assignment that would satisfy:
(32) x1 cherishes that cleric who crowned x1
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डe standard reasoning about quantiৱcation, then, involves a version of Lewis’ principle
to the eৰect that a parameter deserves to be considered part of a semantic index when a
natural language involves an operator that shiऑs the value of that parameter.
Of course, there may be philosophers who would reject this principle, and there may
be philosophers who accept it, but have other reasons for adding parameters to an index,
too.55 I will not take up either of those issues here; the point that is crucial for our purposes
is that Lewis’ ‘shiऑy’ principle does not give us a reason to treat the variable assignment
as though it were determined by the context, much less as though it were determined by
particular psychological facts, say, in the way Heim & Kratzer (1998) and others propose.
In other words, while the proper treatment of quantiৱcation in English may well turn out
to involve sequences of objects, there is no reason to think that the composition of those
sequences should result from any psychologically substantive selection procedure.
To see whether a sentence like (33) is intuitively true in a context:
(33) All dogs are mammals.
we check to see whether every assignment of values to variables that satisৱes ‘x is a dog’
satisৱes ‘x is a mammal’. डe clauses we give for quantiৱers test to see whether every as-
signment of values to variables meets some constraint, or whether any assignment does,
but they do not care at all what the ‘initial’ assignment looks like, nor do they require that
there be such thing as an initial assignment. Since the quantiৱer—or a lambda abstrac-
tor associated with it—modiৱes the assignment with regard to which its complement is
interpreted, any pair of arbitrarily-generated assignments will end up producing exactly
the same interpretation.56
Contrast the case of the time parameter. Imagine that someone says:
(34) Forevermore, Socrates will sleep.
Lewis (1980) takes the truth conditions intuitively expressed by (34) in a context to be
determined by applying the ‘forevermore’ operator to the semantic value of:
(35) Socrates sleeps.
55See MacFarlane (2014), chapter 4 for discussion.
56Compare Belnap & Green (1994). In certain cases, like cases involving multiple quantiৱers, it might
be important to keep track of output of some operation involving a variable assignment. डis is hardly a
compelling reason, however, to think that assignments are initialized by the context of uऔerance.
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‘Forevermore’, on Lewis’ account, is an operator that shiऑs the value of the time param-
eter of the index associated with the constituent it operates on. Unlike in the case of the
variable assignment, the initial value of that parameter appears to maऔer.57 (34) is true
with regard to a context just in case (35) is true with regard to all times t such that t is
later than the time of the context.
To summarize: the idea that contexts of uऔerance provide the initial value for a parameter
that tracks the time might plausibly play a role in the explanation we give of the intuitive
truth conditions of sentences involving shiऑy operators, like ‘forevermore’. To explain the
familiar data involving quantiৱers, however, there is no reason to postulate a privileged
initial assignment of values to variables.
7.2 φ-features
I have argued throughout that demonstratives have no lexical semantic content. डere
is a sense in which that seems right, but also a sense in which it may put the point too
strongly. Let me now back oৰ slightly.
If demonstratives are semantically represented simply as free variables, and if the only
constraints onwhich variable assignment is applied to a particular demonstrative in a par-
ticular context are general pragmatic constraints of the sort canvassed so far, we should
expect it to be possible to use demonstratives to refer more-or-less to anything.
In fact, however, this is not what we ৱnd. English simple demonstratives appear to be
subject to certain restrictions concerning animacy and proximity, among other things.
Witness the contrast between the felicitous (36) and the degraded (37):
(36) He’s really handsome. (pointing at a person or a dog)
(37) #डat’s really handsome. (pointing at a person or a dog)
Similarly, compare (38) and (39):
(38) डat is a Jeৰrey pine. (pointing at a lone tree on the horizon)
57Note, however, that if the arguments oৰered here about demonstratives are successful, it might be
possible to dispense with the idea that context initializes the time parameter, too. Instead of saying that
the context initializes a certain value for the time parameter, we might leave the parameter undeৱned, and
expect competent speakers to ৱll in an appropriate value. If the sort of pragmatic approach described here
is successful, in fact, we might be able to dispense with the idea of initialization in general. I will leave this
possibility for future consideration. I am grateful to Seth Yalcin for discussion of this point.
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(39) #डis is a Jeৰrey pine. (pointing at a lone tree on the horizon)
Do contrasts like these undermine the view developed here so far? As far as I can tell,
the answer to this question is ‘not in a signiৱcant way’. For one thing, none of the data
involving restrictions on the reference of a demonstrative are as univocal as they might at
ৱrst appear. Many commentators have noticed, for example, that English demonstratives
are frequently used with equative or identiৱcational copular clauses:58
(40) डis is Maryam Mirzakhani, the 2014 Fields Medal winner.
(41) डat is the guy who discovered the Higgs boson.
(42) डat is the guy I was talking about earlier.
Certain predicates appear to license ‘animate’ simple demonstratives in English, too:
(43) डat is a world-famous scientist you just talked to. (as someone walks away)
(44) डat is a lab-boxer mix. (pointing at a dog)
Similarly, Sherman (2015) has shown that the distal/proximal features that appear to be
associated with English demonstratives are much more plastic than simple contrasts like
the one between (38) and (39) suggest. Whether an object counts as near enough to be
referred to with ‘this’ turns out to have less to do with the absolute proximity of the
object to the speaker than it does with the nature of the preceding discourse.
Even if we accept data like (38)–(44) at face value, though, we can handle them without
substantially revising the non-contextualist variablismwe have argued for here.डere are
many options available to theorists who treat referential pronouns as free variables that
involve presuppositions about number, gender, and similar features.59 Without commit-
ting ourselves to any particular story about how presupposition should be handled, we
could take a similar approach with regard to demonstratives, while maintaining our cen-
tral claim that the assertoric contents associated with demonstratives are not determined
by the contexts in which they are uऔered.
Indeed, the sorts of reasons that might be invoked in favor of presuppositional constraints
on reference themselves suggest that the basic non-contextualist idea is right: it makes
sense to think that demonstratives from diৰerent languages come with a particular pre-
suppositional proৱle, since the distribution of those demonstratives is diৰerent. English
58Some take this fact to show that the demonstratives in question do not really refer to people; see
Moltmann (2013) for discussion.
59See e.g. Sudo (2012) and del Prete & Zucchi (2017) for discussion.
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demonstratives appear to involve a binary distal/proximal distinction. Korean demon-
stratives involve proximity measures that treat the speaker’s and the listener’s perspec-
tives diৰerently.60 Spanish demonstratives involve a ternary distinction between degrees
of proximity instead of a binary distinction, and so on.61 No human language, however,
appears to lack expressions that are used in various contexts to refer to whatever the
speaker of the context intends to refer to, and to the best of my knowledge, no human
language involves demonstrative-like expressions that pick out the objects of someone
other than the speaker’s intentions. डis is a powerful reason to allow demonstratives to
vary locally with regard to their presuppositional proৱles, while insisting that at root,
what constraints there are on demonstrative reference fall out of the nature of the inter-
pretive task.
8 Conclusion
We began with a review of arguments designed to show that lexical contextualism—the
idea that contexts of uऔerance determine the semantic value of a demonstrative—should
be replaced by a semantic theory on which demonstratives are treated as variables.
Replacing the familiar form of lexical contextualismwith a variablist picture, however, leऑ
us with a question: how should we explain the fact that assertoric contents appear to vary
systematically over contexts of uऔerance?We considered one answer, according to which
contexts determine the proposition associated with a sentence by providing initial values
for the parameters with regard to which the semantic value of the sentence is evaluated.
डis option commiऔed us to saying that a demonstrative sentence in an apt context must
be associated with just one proposition. Our intuitions, however, seemed to suggest that
there are a range of diৰerent ways in which a proposition might count as having been
expressed in a context. We took this to show that we should dispense with the claim
that context initializes a particular variable assignment, and instead embrace the idea
that a range of variable assignments might be used to model diৰerent but theoretically-
interesting features of a context.
Although our discussion was focused on demonstratives throughout, the theoretical is-
sues that we have considered raise general questions about the relationship between se-
mantic values and the propositions those values are used to express. If we can explain
60Compare ‘kuh gon’, which is used to pick out objects that are far from the speaker but near to the
hearer, and ‘joh gon’, which is used when the object in question is far from both speaker and hearer.
61Compare ‘éste’, ‘ése’, ‘aquél’, which correspond to English ‘this’, ‘that’, and ‘yon’.
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the intuitive data about demonstratives without invoking the context, there is room to
wonder about how signiৱcant a role context sensitivity will have in the explanation of
other phenomena that have traditionally been assumed to involve context.
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